By Adonis
Byemelwa
The gavel that ended the 39th
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union didn't fall; it settled
softly, almost sweetly, over the conference hall in Addis Ababa. Delegates got
up. The aides got the folders. The last handshakes were caught on camera.
Outside, convoys waited in the
highland air. Inside, the language of success stayed strong: promises were
kept, partnerships were deepened, and togetherness was restored. Anyone who has
seen these summits happen understands how they work. The hope is real. So is
the tiredness.
African diplomacy has learned
how to sound urgent without sounding like it wants to fight. Communiqués
proceed slowly, like experienced negotiators, never accusing, rarely binding,
and always hopeful. Nonetheless, optimism feels like a coin that is running out
throughout most of the continent today.
Events do not want to comply
with diplomatic pacing since they happen outside the guarded stillness of
summit halls. War keeps going on in Sudan, forcing millions of people to leave
their homes more quickly than mediation mechanisms can help. Armed groups take
advantage of a weak government in the Sahel.
People in the Eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo still think of peace in weeks instead of years. Drought
and displacement are quietly changing the political landscape across the Horn
of Africa, where climate shocks and instability are connected.
In such a context, reaffirmation
starts to feel less like leadership and more like a ritual. Not because the
summit did not want to do anything. The agenda was broad, including speeding up
the integration of the continent, making progress on water and sanitation
targets, establishing financial independence, reforming institutions, and
protecting Africa's place in global governance debates. The issue is not
eyesight. Africa comes up with plans at an amazing rate.
The issue is buildup. Layered
frameworks frequently reside on top of older frameworks, adding new reporting
requirements without getting rid of the old ones. Officials go home with orders
that depend on ministries that are already having trouble paying off debt,
dealing with political instability, or not having enough staff.
Implementation does not fail in a big way; it
just slows down until the following peak cycle, when momentum fades. Some
critics see this as a sign of incompetence. That does not get to the harder
truth.
The AU was never meant to be a
powerful organisation that could force sovereign states to do things.
Enforcement powers are nevertheless limited on purpose, unlike integration
attempts in other places. Heads of state answer first to their own voters and
their own political survival. The organising concept is consensus, not
coercion.
But recognising structural
restrictions does not justify institutional intransigence. The summit's
statement again stressed the need to resolve disputes and speed up the goals of
Agenda 2063, but there are still no clear ways to implement these goals.
There are ways to keep an eye on
things, including the African Peer Review Mechanism's governance assessments,
but in the end, participation and compliance depend on political openness that
is voluntary.
Peer pressure does not function the same way
when the reputational costs are very different between states. Not having
timeframes is not just a matter of procedure. It sets expectations. When
timelines go fuzzy, so does responsibility.
Think about how to pay for it.
Despite long-standing promises of financial independence through member-state
payments and levy mechanisms, many continental programs rely significantly on
outside funders.
Even well-designed initiatives can go off
course between being too ambitious and too expensive if there are no clear
financial pathways linked to deliverables. This is something diplomats know
privately. Talks in hallways typically sound crisper than speeches at the
podium.
There is a reform movement.
Kenyan President William Ruto's proposals aimed to make the summit more
efficient by reducing the number of meetings and decision-making layers. This
was a realisation that institutional congestion had become a problem in and of
itself.
Scholars like Ueli Staeger have
said that one of the most useful things that could come out of the session is
administrative efficiency. Still, reform plans suffer the same problem that
most continental projects do: everyone agrees that change is needed, as long as
it does not weaken national power.
That tension came up a lot when
people talked about changing how the world is run. Historically and
strategically, Africa's demand for fair representation at the United Nations
Security Council makes sense.
Still, just repeating something
will not change long-standing geopolitical facts. Permanent members hardly ever
give up their privileges unless there is coordinated diplomatic pressure from
allies, economic leverage, or a single bargaining approach.
Principle necessitates strategy.
It is not fair to act as if nothing works either. AU mediation teams are still
secretly becoming involved in election conflicts. Election observation missions
help save unstable democracies from getting worse.
Humanitarian coordination
typically happens without headlines because success seems like a catastrophe
that was avoided instead of drama that was handled.
However, small steps forward
have a hard time keeping up with situations that are getting worse quickly.
Public debt is currently limiting the fiscal space in many states. Cholera
outbreaks and water insecurity show deficiencies in infrastructure that people
do not see as policy arguments, but as empty taps and congested clinics.
Young Africans who are looking
for work in other countries do not look to declarations to see how well the
continent is coming together; they look at whether borders are open to new
opportunities.
Summits are more and more likely
to become mirrors that show what people want instead of motors that make things
happen. That annoyance is not just for commentators anymore. Gilbert
Khadiagala, an expert on international relations at the University of the
Witwatersrand, said, "We need a moratorium on summits." This was more
about adjusting than cancelling. Some people say that fewer meetings might make
them work together more closely.
Still, criticism alone cannot
bring about change. If you want to be credible, you have to make a few changes.
Continental decisions need benchmarks that can be tracked by the public, not
only reports that are kept inside the company.
Funding commitments need to be
linked to specific deliverables, not just general goals. When governments routinely
flout agreed-upon criteria, peer review systems need to include options to
escalate the issue. Also, and maybe most crucially, having fewer priorities
would make it easier to do things better.
None of these requests gives up
sovereignty. It calls for a new definition of leadership as measurable delivery
instead of negotiated words. As soon as you leave the summit compound in Addis
Ababa, you enter a different Africa.
Taxi drivers are disputing about
gas costs, young businesspeople are talking about digital payments, and
students are arguing about politics over coffee. Expectations are realistic.
People do not care as much about statements as they do about whether the power
stays on or trade borders keep open.
Credibility starts to fade when
there is a gap between diplomatic time and real time. Africa has a lot of
ideas. It has enough institutions. It has both skilled diplomats and ambitious
plans. What it still needs is a strong enough penalty to turn agreement into
action.
Until continental gatherings
change from affirmation forums to benchmark-driven assemblies that citizens can
follow in real time, summit season will continue to produce eloquent
communiqués and beautiful photos. Though history tends to remember what
happened. The question that everyone is asking across the continent is still
pretty simple: Where are the results?
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